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Aryan Idols, Stefan Arvidsson’s impressive historiography of the “Indo-European discourse,”
courageously takes on the task of de-mythologizing that discourse and looking anew at its past
influences and its present (and future) implications.1  “Myth transforms history into fate,” he
writes; “historiography reveals -- in the best case -- fate as the result of decisions made” (322).
Arvidsson meticulously traces the “decisions made” from the discovery of the Indo-European
language family by Sir William “Oriental” Jones in 1786 to the ideological and academic turf
wars of today.  He speculates provocatively about the underlying motives and long-term
consequences of the decisions that Indo-European scholars have made over the course of 200
years.  His project is  ambitious, timely, and thought-provoking.  It also offers a much-needed
reminder of the perils posed when science gets into bed with ideology.2 Science and ideology,
he concludes, have never been as compartmentalized as scientists often like to pretend, and so
they should anticipate unexpected consequences -- as the Indo-European discourse has
demonstrated.   
Arvidsson’s detailed study begins with an epigraph from Nietzsche’s Die Götzen-Dämmerung:
“There are more idols than realities in the world.”   His choice of philosopher, epigraph, and
title make clear which idols Arvidsson has in mind.  His  quarry is the intellectual construction
of “the Indo-European” in the service of, let us say, both modern “science” and modern “idol-
ology” as the European mind formulated them.  He reminds us that, while positing prehistoric
peoples such as the Proto-Indo-Europeans is, “to use the words of Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘good
to think with,’” we must still admit to certain critical facts:  the Proto-Indo-Europeans “have
not left behind any texts, no objects can be definitely tied to them, nor do we know any ‘Indo-
1 Stefan Arvidsson.  Aryan Idols:  Indo-European Mythology as Ideology and Science.  Translated by Sonia Wichmann.
Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2006.  354 pp.  $55.00 (cloth).  ISBN 978-0-226-02860-6.  All citations are
from this volume; page numbers are provided in parentheses.
2 In this essay, I use “science” in its broadest sense of scientia, knowledge, наука.  Humanists and social scientists are
not let off this hook.  
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European’ by name” (xi).  What, then, besides the temptations of imagination made possible by
a paucity of concrete documentation, explains the influence, longevity, and ideological
trajectories of the idols that the “Indo-European discourse” raised and worshipped?  Arvidsson
answers this question in Aryan Idols methodically, analyzing the academic dialogue of ideas
and agendas that formed the discourse. 
In five chapters, Arvidsson surveys the Indo-European discourse from its inception.  He
describes the new “Indomania” that swept Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries:  he
traces the roots of Indo-European linguistics in William Jones and Thomas Young and the stem
of  Indo-European mythology in Herder and German Romanticism.  He shows how the Indo-
European discourse was shaped by counter-Enlightenment and Romantic thought, by growing
English imperialism, by French response to the power of ecclesiastical Christianity, and by the
new Germanic identity that was forged between the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in
1806 and German unification in 1871.  He carefully tracks the Indo-European discourse’s
increasingly strident challenges to both the perceived “creative center” of the Judaeo-Christian
dominant of Western culture and to the Hebrew claim to stand at the “origins of history,” as
described in the Bible.
With sympathy, Arvidsson surveys the centrality of the Oxford don from Germany, the
orientalist Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), whose cocktail of comparative philology, culture,
religion, and nature mythology dominated the Indo-European discourse for a significant part
of the mid-19th century.  He examines the contributions to the discourse of French intellectuals
and explains why Jules Michelet (1798-1874) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892) employed the
discourse to respond to Catholicism’s ecclesiastical Christianity and to perceived Jewish
(cultural) and Semitic (racial) challenges to European culture.   In Michelet and Renan’s
discourses, the Indo-European emerges as a self-governing, rational, secularized individual,
while the Semite becomes his collective, fanatic opposite (94-96).3  
Arvidsson’s book tackles the issues of race head-on, but not without awareness of the dangers
inherent in projecting 21st century knowledge and experience (especially the experience of Nazi
ideology and its consequences, theoretical and actual) onto 19th century polemics.  He points
out that, in their own context, “Michelet’s, Quinet’s, and Renan’s struggle against ‘Semitic
mentality’ and Judeo-Christian religiosity was a struggle against dogmatism, irrationalism, and
conservatism, and for science, secular law-making, and education” (108).  But Arvidsson also
points out that, over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Indo-European discourse
3 The most common “others” (non-Aryan or “anti-Aryan”) in the Indo-European discourse have been, at various
times, Dravidians, the indigenous, pre-Indo-European populations of Europe, and Semites.  
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would accommodate a multiplicity of other discourses, never overtly identified by their
constituencies:  justification of colonialism, expression of religious, ethnic, and racial
prejudices, nationalism, anti-clericalism, and even fear of modernity.  These are volatile issues
indeed, but the particular evolution of the Indo-European discourse allowed them to be safely
“displaced” from potentially dangerous social and political arenas into a relatively safer
academic space where they could be discussed in an “objective” and gentleman-like manner by
erudite professors.
Next Arvidsson tackles the alternative Indo-European model proposed by the emergence of
racial and evolutionary anthropology.  The emergence of anthropology as an academic
discipline pitted a new “Aryan naturalism” against the prevailing liberal “Aryan romanticism”
(105-106), which had been rooted in the disciplines of linguistics and philology.4  In the last
third of the 19th century,  European anthropologists, basing their theories on developments in
physiological science, archaeology, material culture, and geography, were ready to rank
“other” races from the superior perspective of their own.  The racial anthropologists projected
good, noble, and manly traits onto the “Indo-Europeans” (defined as light-skinned Nordics
with tools, weapons, culture, and great leadership potential) and primitive, passive traits onto
dark-skinned races.  In this way they provided a “scientific” justification for imperialism,
colonialism, and even slavery, while generating credibility for their ideological positions.5  
As the end of the 19th century approached, Aryan Romanticism and the Indo-European
discourse moved to the “right.”  Perceived at the century’s start as the realm of progressive
“humanism and liberalism,” the Indo-European discourse succumbed to “vitalism,
nationalism, and mysticism” (125) by the century’s end.6  Its representatives were no longer
modernizers; they were now neo-traditionalists who wished to revitalize national tradition as a
counterbalance to modernism and materialism by using the “weapons” of modernity against
modernity.  They were conservative -- even reactionary -- and nationalistic.  Wagnerianism
embodies this new trend.  In the scientific works of the academic Gustaf Kossina (1858-1931)
and the ideological tracts of Wagner’s son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927),
4 The word “Aryan” was introduced in the mid-19th century to distinguish the light-skinned, linguistically Indo-
European Indians of the North (Aryans) from the dark-skinned, non-Indo-European Indians of the South.  The
introduction of the term “Aryan” was not casual:  the “Indo-European” marker was linguistic; the “Aryan”
marker is racial.  
5 The political and social supervision, religious conversion, education, and employment of inferior races became
the “white man’s burden,” i.e., the obligation and duty of the superior race to their inferior brothers for the
latter’s own benefit.    That divisive term first appeared in Rudyard Kipling’s Eurocentric 1899 poem, “The White
Man’s Burden,” which describes the colonizers’ noble sense of obligation in the face of the ingratitude of the
colonized.   
6 Arvidsson defines “vitalism” here as life affirmation, the affirmation of a “strong, natural, earthly life” (152)
associated with this world and nature (the notion is opposed to the belief in an afterlife of the soul).  
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issues of Germanic racial purity and vitalism entered the Indo-European discourse in a dark,
new way.  Kossina, Chamberlain, and their colleagues gave rise to the national-romantic
movement collectively called Das Völkische, which revitalized paganism, nature and solar cults,
Germanic folklore, and seasonal rites.  The impact of its world view was felt to the very end of
the Third Reich, and today it continues to echo in the cult popularity of certain lines within
modern Germanic and Nordic neo-paganism.
During the period 1930 to 1945, Arvidsson observes, “Indo-European research, and the entire
Indo-European discourse, became involved in ideological contexts that will forever make them
suspect in many people’s eyes” (178).  He describes the polemics of the period between the
“mythologists” (the culture warriors) and the “ritualists” (the sociologists) of Himmler’s
Ahnenerbe (Forschungsinstitut für Geistesurgeschichte).  The Nazi ritualists on whom
Arvidsson focuses valorized the male warrior culture of the Männerbünde, with its Odinic
idealization of battle frenzy, heroism, tragedy, and death.  Under the Nazi regime, mythology
and ritual met reality in the same way that anti-matter meets matter, with similar explosive
results.7  Ironically, within a few years after 1945, many of these scholars whose research had
played a critical role in the SS - Ahnenerbe and the Nazi world view, returned to German
universities to become leading post-war scholars.   
Since the Second World War, the Indo-European discourse has been dominated by two
theories.  The first is philologist Georges Dumézil’s (1898-1986) well-known and influential
theory of the tripartite function.8  “As long as there is no new theory about Proto-Indo-
European religion, and as long as scholars continue to use the category ‘Indo-European
religion,’ this theory will remain,” Arvidsson concludes (307), although his reading of it is that
Dumézil anachronistically attributed class structure to classless (pre-class) societies (299) and
that his theory reveals more about the Indo-European discourse than about Indo-Europeans.
The second dominant theory is archaeologist Marija Gimbutas’s (1921-1994) highly speculative
view of Indo-Europeans as patriarchal, warlike horsemen  from the southern Russian steppes
who overran matrifocal, peaceful pre-Indo-European populations in Europe (as first described
by Bachofen).  In Arvidsson’s view, both theories are rooted in a reactionary world view:
7 Arvidsson points out, but does not develop in detail, the fact that reactionary Nazi ideology was effectively
coupled with the use of modern methodologies, science, and technology.  Although Arvidsson does not cite the
volume, Jeffrey Herf’s Reactionary Modernism; Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich
(Cambridge:  CUP, 1984) is relevant here in explaining how mythology and science became bedfellows in Hitler’s
Germany.
8 Dumézil’s trifunctional hypothesis identifies sovereignty, war, and production as the three “functions” of Proto-
Indo-European social structure; additionally, he divides “sovereignty” into light and legal [kingship] and dark
and magic [priesthood]; his hypothesis can be explicated in other terms as well.  No concrete evidence indicates
that it was a feature of early Indo-European societies.  Dumézil’s hypothesis has come in for considerable
criticism and has been accused of being as “mythological” as its material.  
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Dumézil’s in hierarchical, anti-democratic French (but not Nazi) fascism, and Gimbutas’s in
“neo-traditionalist, vitalistic reaction against modernistic ideals” (292).
As a counterbalance to Dumézil, Gimbutas, and other 20th century scholars of the discourse,
Arvidsson foregrounds the work of Bruce Lincoln, an historian of religions at the University of
Chicago:  
Bruce Lincoln is the scholar who has tried most tenaciously to come to terms with Indo-
European mythology.  Lincoln has chosen several different strategies to change the
research about Indo-European mythology; among other things he has argued for the
value of historicism, redefined the notion of myth from a power perspective, and
developed a critical history of the discipline.  By means of investigations into the history
of scholarship, empirical studies, and theoretical reflections, Lincoln has tried to once
and for all topple all Indo-European, Indo-German, and Aryan idols. (308)
Arvidsson deplores the exclusion of Lincoln’s work from the continuing Indo-European
discourse by those scholars who resent Lincoln’s perceived attacks on Georges Dumézil’s
French Fascist sympathies in his scholarship.  Lincoln’s attempt to “clean up” the Indo-
European discourse by rejecting uncritical comparativism and the subjective reconstruction of
ancient myths not surprisingly evoked its own reaction from the European Indo-Europeanists.9
Arvidsson also takes up the issue of the Indo-European Urheimat.  He demonstrates how the
two-hundred year evolution of Aryan ideology is reflected in the peregrinations of the
supposed original homeland.  The Urheimat was first located in India, but later scholars
relocated it to Iran; it then traveled to northern Europe, and finally it settled on the southern
Russian steppes.  During the Urheimat’s wanderings, new, conflicting images of the Proto-Indo-
European emerged:  he was the founder of European languages and culture (India); he was a
noble farmer with a high civilization and well-ordered community (Iran); he was a warlike and
martial barbarian who valued honor and courage in battle above all else and embraced death
(Northern Europe); he was the dynamic, horse-mounted conquerer of a passive, pre-Indo-
European, Europid population (Russian steppes).  Ultimately, the Proto-Indo-European was a
9 Readers interested in the “dark side” or the academic underbelly of the Indo-European discourse are referred to
footnote 198 on p. 306 of Arvidsson’s text.  The footnote also explains why Jaan Puhvel and perhaps J.P. Mallory
are only briefly and glancingly mentioned in Aryan Idols.  Another issue is Bruce Lincoln’s overtly Marxist point
of view.  Marxism has traditionally criticized the neo-traditionalist and reactionary aspects of the Indo-European
discourse and has been criticized by it in turn.  See also:  Bruce Lincoln, “Dumézil, Ideology, and the Indo-
Europeans,” in Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 98 (1999): 221-227, in which Lincoln traces Dumézil’s
connections with the extreme right.   Revered as an important scholar, Dumézil remains an ideologically
ambiguous figure.  
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mirror for European dreams and neuroses:  little textual or archaeological evidence exists for
any of these particular interpretations of the Proto-Indo-European or the location of his
Urheimat.
The Indo-European discourse did, however, play an important role in shaping modern
European identity.  It modeled a dualistic and complementary view of the Aryan and the
“other,” privileging the Aryans:  Aryans were imaginative, while the “others” were
unimaginative; Aryans embraced this life, while others obsessed about a hypothetical afterlife;
Aryans were brave warriors, while others were peaceful and timid; Aryans were nomadic
herders, which others were settled farmers; Aryans were patriarchal, while others were
matrifocal; Aryans were natural leaders, while others were natural followers, etc.  Such
consistent complementariness argues that motives other than the objective accumulation of
linguistic, anthropological, or archaeological evidence have colored the Indo-European
discourse.
The academy has lived with the Indo-European discourse for so long that many scholars
assume that it is more than a hypothesis, that it must lie on a bedrock of hard scientific fact.  In
spite of the clear limitations of our factual knowledge of Indo-Europeans, Arvidsson points out,
for many scholars “’the Indo-Europeans’ exist in the same way that birches or houses do, and
not in the same way as, for example, ‘the Orient,’ ‘atoms,’ or ‘paleolithicum [i.e., the
Paleolithic]’; that is to say, [for many scholars the Indo-Europeans exist] not as objects that have
been named and created by and for research, and whose right to existence is dependent on a
number of (in the best case scenario) clearly formulated criteria and questions,” but as an
physical and historical entity with an independent existence (252-53).  Over time, some scholars
became comfortable with the idea that there had once existed an identifiable group of people
who shared Indo-European language and therefore must also have shared Indo-European
culture, religion, and even racial characteristics; that the “Indo-European-ness” (identity) of
this group was crucial to understanding their values and belief system; that these values and
beliefs differed in significant ways from middle Eastern Jewish/Semitic or Judeo-Christian
paradigms and were more “appropriate” for Europeans.  (Clearly some of their assumptions
led to various unpleasant complications and will no doubt lead to still others in the future.)
Arvidsson’s study steps back from these assumptions and reminds the reader that the Indo-
European discourse is not a constellation of known facts and documents, but an intellectual tool
constructed over modern time and across European space.  It is an artificial discourse created
by scholars to provide a platform for, among other things, intellectual speculation about
origins, identity, self-esteem, knowledge, belonging, and class.    
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Taking the long view, Arvidsson observes that the evolution of the Indo-European discourse
coincides with the history of national, religious, ideological, class, and political prejudices held
by educated, middle-class European males over the course of two centuries.   The Indo-
European discourse, by proposing an idealized Indo-European race of cultural heroes and
conquerers, was simultaneously reacting against two things:  a) the fast pace of modernity, i.e.,
against the growing industrialization and urbanization of Europe in the 19th century and the
social, economic, political, and psychological shifts that it brought, and b) expressing fear of the
nomads, savages, and barbarians who seemed to populate much of the world beyond Europe
and who were brought to the attention of Europeans by explorers, missionaries, and the
servants of empire.  Arvidsson describes the Indo-European discourse as a modern
mythological discourse that is necessarily set in the context of the enormous changes
experienced by European society over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.  But whose
mythological discourse is it?  Of whose mythology does Arvidsson speak?  
Arvidsson concludes, “The epic about the Aryan has in many ways been an epic about
bourgeois ideals, and it has also gone hand in hand with the ideological changes of this class”
(318).  So “Indo-European research has, in many ways, been an attempt to write the origin
narrative of the bourgeois class -- a narrative that, by talking about how things originally were,
has sanctioned a certain kind of behavior, idealized a certain type of persona, and affirmed
certain feelings” (319-320).  As Enlightenment rationalism, empiricism, and modern science
came to dominate the cultural products and ideologies of Europe, myth was driven into other
venues:  not only into such obvious havens as literature, art, and film, but also into the
discourses of depth (analytical) psychology, ethnology and folklore, comparative religions,
anthropology, and -- Indo-European studies.  
The aristocrats and ruling elites were not concerned with issues of identity -- why should they
be?  They ruled by divine right and traced their bloodlines over centuries.  Neither did the
clergy have identity issues:  regardless of class origin, the Church provided them with a
defined group identity and discouraged radical individualism.  Peasants also knew who they
were (and who they were not) and what their earthly mission was.  Frenchmen, Britons, Slavs,
Scandinavians, Basques, Italians, and others had a sense of their national identities.  But the
emerging European bourgeoisie -- as a class that cut across national lines and was composed of
peasants who had moved up, fringe elites who had moved down, and, in between, urban
dwellers, artisans, and producers who found themselves moving with uncontrollable speed
toward modernity -- developed identity problems.  The identity issue was particularly felt by
the men of the educated bourgeoisie, those who became the scholars, historians, and professors
7
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of the new 19th century German-style university system and who controlled the Indo-European
discourse.10   
Two additional factors support Arvidsson’s conclusion that the Indo-European discourse was a
middle-class male preserve.  First of all, the leading proponents of the discourse in the 19th and
20th centuries did indeed stem from the educated bourgeoisie, for the Indo-European discourse
was overwhelmingly an academic issue.   With two 20th century exceptions, the polemicists
were male.11  Second, those who passionately rejected the claims of Aryan superiority and other
valorizing elements of the Indo-European discourse were those whose philosophies fell outside
bourgeois parameters:  the Austrian barbarophile Otto Höfler (1901-1987); the socialist and
archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe (1892-1957); the Catholic and royalist Father Wilhelm
Schmidt (1868-1954); and the feminist Marija Gimbutas.
As a scholar, Arvidsson is as much molded by his own age and its philosophies and rivalries as
Friedrich Max Müller was molded by  liberal Protestantism, or Ernest Renan by French anti-
clericalism, or Mircea Eliade by early Nazi sympathies, or Marija Gimbutas by her antipathy
for the Soviets and her feminism.  “Of course, the closer we come to our own time the harder it
is to see how ideologies -- in which we ourselves swim around -- affect the truth seeking that
strives for objectivity and persuasive evidence,” Arvidsson points out (292).  No one entirely
escapes their cultural and historical patrimony.  Arvidsson himself “swims” to some degree in
Marxism (albeit not in any dogmatic way).  His study is a useful contribution to the “house-
cleaning” of the discourse first proposed by Bruce Lincoln.   Part of a growing critique of the
Indo-European discourse, his work exposes prevailing assumptions, documents and
summarizes the discourse, and opens provocative new perspectives on the troublesome but
perpetually fascinating concept of the Indo-European.12  
After concluding Arvidsson’s text, the reader must consider the degree to which the Indo-
European discourse documents the rejection of the liberal Enlightenment ideal of “universal
humanity” (humanism).  That ideal proposed that all people, all races, are fundamentally the
10 Arvidsson distinguishes between the educated bourgeoisie and the capitalist bourgeoisie; his work addresses the
mythology of the former.  He also makes the point that the Indo-European discourse was a middle-class male
mythology:  women, children, and proletarians were excluded and forced into the “mythic”role of irrational
savages, inferior classes, or “Pelasgians” (319; here Arvidsson uses the term “Pelasgian” broadly, to refer to the
[supposedly inferior] pre-Indo-European, Europid population of Europe, not just of Greece).   
11 The two exceptions were the pre-Nazi, völkisch-cultic scholar Lily Weiser-Aall (a student of Otto Höfler’s) and the
Lithuanian-American feminist Marija Gimbutas.   
12 Another new work that also attempts to “defang” certain aspects of the Aryan myth by taking a sober, historical
look at the inter-relationships among the disciplines of language, archaeology, and culture is David W. Anthony’s
very readable study, The Horse, the Wheel, and Language: How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the
Modern World (Princeton:  PUP, 2007).  
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same, with the same potential to evolve into primitive and/or into civilized societies (allowing
for the obvious fact that geography, weather, resources, food supply, etc. make a difference to
the direction and speed of the developmental path).  Counter-enlightenment, particularism,
and nationalism, on the other hand, divide humanity into discrete groups and assume at best
that they have different abilities and potential and at worst that some groups are physically,
intellectually, and/or morally  superior to others according to standards that they alone define.  
But the issue does not rest there.  Reading Arvidsson’s historiography from the vantage point
of the 21st century, for example, we might speculate that the Indo-European discourse he
describes has also served as a surrogate for both anti-Christian (marked) and subsequently
post-Christian (unmarked)  ideas in European thought.  Such a philosophical/ethical position
could not be openly taken in the 18th or 19th century, given the religious, social, and cultural
dominance of Christianity.   Even the rationalism of the Enlightenment (and its agnosticism
and even atheism) were insufficient to shift the Christian ideological structures set firmly in
place in Europe during the Middle Ages.  The Indo-European discourse, on the other hand,
provided an intellectual space in which such ideas might be examined and considered -- albeit
in a “displaced,” academic  sort of way.  The Indo-European discourse’s growing obsession
with pagan gods, pagan ideals, and pagan rituals was dressed in the garments of history,
philology, and anthropology, but the original obsession may have represented something else.
That this may have been the case in the past is supported today by the growing contemporary
interest in neo-paganism, its overt and sometimes vehement rejection of Christianity,  its
conscious use of the term “post-Christian” to describe this rejection, and its dependence on the
research and writings of the Indo-European discourse to describe and justify its own existence.
Aryan Idols tempts the reader to radical speculation and Big Picture moments (as I just
demonstrated in the preceding paragraph).  Arvidsson should be praised for not fearing to to
tackle the I-word (ideology) or to make value judgments about the ideological subtext of the
Indo-European discourse.  As a scholar of comparative religion and philosophy of religion,
however, Arvidsson neither exceeds his academic brief nor engages in  ideological wars.  But a
new player has recently entered the Indo-European discourse:  genetic research has already
begun to meddle seriously in its assumptions.  Early returns indicate that the gene pool does
not correspond to the linguistic dominant (in the British Isles, for example, the language may
be Indo-European, but the genes are are traceable to pre-Indo-European, Europid ancestors,
probably Iberian).  This new research may validate the language-culture scholars and impugn
the racial anthropologists among Indo-Europeanists, and perhaps the Indo-European
“discourse” will be settled once and for all (although we should not hold our breath).
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At the start of his historiography Arvidsson asked “whether there is something in the nature of
research about Indo-Europeans that makes it especially prone to ideological abuse” (3), and by
the end of his study, he has presented a convincing argument that there must be.  He explains,
in considerable detail, the manner in which the Indo-European discourse was transformed
“from a bourgeois, largely liberal humanism to a nationalist and racist ‘primitivism,’ from
Aryan romanticism to Aryan nationalism” (149).  The “Indo-European discourse” is thus the
incremental creation of an “Aryan myth,” a scientific, erudite myth that requires the
collaboration of linguistics, mythology, comparative religions, anthropology, archaeology,
cultural history, and even psychology.  The lines between myth and ideology and science and
ideology, it turns out, are not as clearly drawn as some would like to believe.  Ideology does
shape scholarship, even “scientific” scholarship.  Arvidsson's study shows how clear this is in
the Indo-European case -- and his work should prod all scholars to remember the limitations
imposed on interpretation and understanding by history, belief, and human desire.  
Two final, brief comments:  First, Arvidsson makes assumptions about his readers’ knowledge
base.  This is not a book for readers who are curious about what Indo-European studies are
generally about.  It is dense, but it rewards effort.  Second, readers should be alert to occasional
infelicities by the translator, especially from German, and the odd typo.  These do not detract
from an otherwise competent translation, although the reader should pay particular attention
to the use of “modern,” “modernism,” “modernist,” and “modernity” -- these are not identical
concepts (in spite of their sharing an Indo-European root).  
Second, Arvidsson’s study provides an extremely useful context for scholars considering the
most recent development in the Indo-European discourse:  today’s neo-pagan movements in
Northern Europe, Scandinavia, the Baltic states, and Russia, especially the new Russian
Aryanism and Eurasianism,  and their connections to the rise of neo-Fascism and right-wing
movements in post-collapse Russia.
Maria Carlson
University of Kansas
An abridged versions of these comments was published in Folklorica, the publication of SEEFA (Slavic and
East European Folklore Association).  See vol. 13 (2008).
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